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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

GLEN C. WEISER,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Appellate Case No. 20080124-SC
(District Court No. 910749302PR)

vs.
Nature of Proceeding: Appeal
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY,
Defendant/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Defendant/Appellee, Union Pacific Railroad Company ("Union Pacific"),
respectfully submits this brief in answer to the opening brief of Plaintiff/Appellant, Glen
C. Weiser ("Weiser").

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is proper in this Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(j), which
gives the Court of Appeals jurisdiction over appeals transferred from the Supreme Court.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE

16 Stat. 395, December 15,1870

5,8,12,19

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
In this case, the parties dispute ownership of a tract of land in Davis County, Utah. A
portion of the property falls within the limits of a December 15, 1870, Act of Congress
right-of-way grant to Utah Central Railroad Company ("Utah Central"), Union Pacific's
predecessor-in-interest. R. 2944 at 2-3. Weiser's predecessor-in-interest, George
Tomlinson, received a patent to the property on September 25, 1873. R. 4-5. Weiser
alleges that he is the sole owner of the property. He brought this action for declaratory
relief, ejectment, and damages. R. 4-12.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW

Weiser filed a Verified Complaint on January 31, 1991, in which he raised claims
for forcible detainer, trespass, unjust enrichment, restitution of premises, declaratory
relief, and special damages. R. 1-15. On October 5, 1992, Weiser moved for partial
summary judgment, seeking a ruling that he held title to the property and that Union
Pacific had no interest. R. 136-140, 197-218. In its opposition to Weiser's motion, Union
Pacific argued that it held a fee interest in the property by virtue of the 1870 Act of
Congress right-of-way grant to Utah Central that defeated Weiser's interest in the
property. R. 297-98, 299-312. The trial court heard argument and ruled in favor of

2

Weiser, finding that Utah Central did not receive the benefit of the right-of-way grant
because it did not file a profile map with the Secretary of the Interior by the deadline set
in the Act. R. 639-48, 823-34.
The trial court certified the partial summary judgment as final pursuant to Rule
54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Union Pacific appealed. R. 836-37, 840.
After oral argument, the Utah Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, holding that the order appealed from was not properly certifiable, and
proceedings in the trial court resumed. R. 911-12.
On October 20, 2000, Union Pacific sought reconsideration of the trial court's
ruling that Union Pacific held no interest in the property because Utah Central did not
timely submit a profile map. R. 1315-27. Weiser opposed the motion. R. 1450-70. The
trial court heard argument and granted Union Pacific's motion on October 1, 2001. R.
1498-1514.
Relying on United States v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co., 177 U.S. 435 (1900),
the trial court ruled that the "lapse of a Land Grant statute before the filing of a profile
map only authorizes the federal government to seek forfeiture of the railroad Land
Grant." R. 1511. The federal government never sought forfeiture of the grant to Utah
Central. Therefore, the trial court ruled, "the federal government, regardless of Utah
Central Railroad's late filing, accepted the profile map as a timely acceptance of the Land
Grant." R. 1511. Ultimately, the trial court ruled that, "[b]ecause the disputed Property is

3

included within the Land Grant's right of way, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has no
valid claim to the Property." R. 1512.
After the trial court's ruling, the parties resolved the remaining issues in the case,
which related to the portion of the property that fell outside the railroad right-of-way.
The trial court entered final judgment on December 21, 2007, R. 2903-2913, and this
appeal followed. R. 2914.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On May 17, 1869, Utah Central began construction of a railroad line from Ogden
to Salt Lake City in the Utah Territory. R. 322. Utah Central completed construction of
the railroad line on January 10, 1870. R. 322.
Almost a year after construction was complete, on December 15, 1870, Congress
passed an Act "granting to the Utah Central Railroad Company a right of way through the
public lands for the construction of a railroad and telegraph." 16 Stat. 395 (attached as
Add. A). The Act granted the Utah Central a 400-foot wide right-of-way for its already
constructed railroad line:
Said way is granted to said railroad to the extent of two
hundred feet in width on each side of said railroad where it
may pass through the public domain, including all necessary
ground for station-buildings, work-shops, depots, machineshops, switches, side-tracks, turn-tables, and water-stations[.]
Id.
Utah Central was required to file a map showing the location of its railroad line:

4

[W]ithin three months from the passage of this Act the said
Utah Central Railroad Company shall file with the Secretary
of the Interior a map to be approved by him, exhibiting the
line of the railroad of said company, as the same has been
located and constructed[.]
Id
The Act further required Utah Central to confirm its acceptance of the terms and
conditions of the Act:
[T]he acceptance of the terms, conditions, and impositions of
this act, by the said Utah Central Railroad Company, shall be
signified in writing under the corporate seal of said company,
duly executed pursuant to the direction of its board of
directors first had and obtained, which acceptance shall be
made within three months after the passage of this act, and
shall be served on the President of the United States; and if
such acceptance and service shall not be so made, this grant
shall be void.
Id § 4.
Accordingly, Utah Central transmitted its acceptance of the terms of the Act to
President Ulysses S. Grant on March 2, 1871. R. 322, 328. President Grant, in turn,
transmitted Utah Central's acceptance to the Secretary of the Interior, Columbus Delano,
on March 4, 1871, R. 341, who received it on March 9, 1871. R. 322, 327.
On March 6, 1871, four days after sending its acceptance of the terms of the Act to
President Grant, Utah Central transmitted to Secretary Delano a profile map showing the
already-constructed railroad line. R. 322, 325-26. Secretary Delano received the map on
March 7, 1871. R. 322, 325. Although the Act did not require the profile map to be
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certified, the Secretary returned the map to Utah Central on March 8, 1871, advising Utah
Central that the "map was not certified and could not be accepted." R. 325.
Twenty-one days later, on March 29, 1871, the Department of the Interior (the
"Department") received a certified profile map from Utah Central. R. 339. The next day,
the Department notified Utah Central that it had accepted the certified profile map. R.
339. On June 26, 1871, the Department sent Utah Central a Certificate of Filing of
Acceptance of Map. R. 325.
More than two years later, on September 25, 1873, George Tomlinson, Weiser's
predecessor-in-interest, received a patent from the United States purporting to patent a
section of Utah Central's right-of-way. R. 3-4. The property is located in present-day
Davis County, near the Salt Lake/Davis County line. R. 314-17.
In 2001, the Utah Legislature passed a bill appropriating funds to the Utah
Department of Transportation ("UDOT") to be used by the Utah Transit Authority
("UTA") to purchase a commuter rail corridor from Union Pacific. R. 2207-08, 2256-57.
The sale contemplated by the Legislature closed on September 20, 2002, and the disputed
property was conveyed to UTA as part of the sale. R. 2257.
The railroad line built by Utah Central has been in continuous operation since
construction was completed in 1870. It formed a part of the nation's trans-continental
railroad system, and is now in use as a commuter rail corridor. On January 23, 1991,
Weiser sued Union Pacific seeking to quiet title to the disputed property. R. 1-15.

6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

This appeal raises the question whether an 1870 Act of Congress right-of-way
grant gave Union Pacific's predecessor, Utah Central, title to the disputed property
superior to George Tomlinson's patent. This question arises out of events that occurred
in the Utah Territory in 1868 to 1871 and that play a small, local part in "a fascinating
chapter in our history." Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 669 (1979).
Like many right-of-way grants to railroads passed by Congress before 1871, the
Act of December 15, 1870, gave Utah Central the land on which the railroad was located.
See Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 274 (1942). Although, beginning in
1871, Congress was much more likely to grant an easement to a railroad for its right-ofway, earlier grants, including the grant to Utah Central, were "of a limited fee, made on
an implied condition of reverter in the event that the company ceased to use or retain the
land for the purpose for which it was granted."1 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Townsend, 190
U.S. 267, 271 (1903).

1

Weiser points out that the 1870 Act says "the right of way" and not "a right of way,"
and argues that the difference largely determines the nature of Utah Central's interest.
Op. Br. at 37. He relies on the Great Northern Railway case to support his argument
that the 1870 right-of-way grant gave Utah Central an easement only. That case traces the
historical evolution of railroad land grants and supports Union Pacific's argument. E.g.,
315 U.S. at 273 ("After 1871, outright grants of public lands to private railroad companies
seem to have been discontinued." (emphasis added)).
This Court has noted that "a railroad right-of-way is a creature that occupies a
unique place among property interests somewhere between traditional easements and fee
interests . . . . " Elder v. Nephi City, 2007 UT % 8 n.3, 164 P.3d 1238. Thus, even if the
1870 Act is construed as granting an easement only, an easement acquired by a railroad
7

Utah Central received all of the property up to 200 feet on either side of the track,
measured from the center line, along the route from Ogden to Salt Lake City. The 1870
right-of-way grant to Utah Central is an example of "our nation's historical practice of
making generous grants of property interests to railroad companies to induce them to
tame the western frontier with the steel conduit of civilization." Elder v. Nephi City,
2007 UT 46,1f 7, 164 P.3d 1238. "The grant was not a mere gift to the Utah Central
Railroad Company, but was designed to promote the interests of the inhabitants of the two
cities [Ogden and Salt Lake City], of the public at large, and of the general government,
as well as those of the grantee." Moon v. Salt Lake County, 76 P. 222, 225 (Utah 1904).
The Act states "[t]hat the right of way through the public lands be, and the same is
hereby, granted[.]" 16 Stat. 395 (attached as Add. A). These words "import a grant in
praesenti and not one infuturo, of the promise of a grant." Missouri, Kans. & Tex. Ry.,
97 U.S. at 496; accord Van Wyckv. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365 (1882). In other words,
the Act "passed to the company a present interest in the lands to be designated within the
limits there specified." Missouri, Kans. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Kansas Pac. Ry. Co., 97 U.S.
491, 496 (1878) (construing July 1, 1862, Congressional grant to Leavenworth, Pawnee,
& W. R. Co.).

company "'requires for its enjoyment a use of the land permanent in its nature and
practically exclusive . . . so that ordinarily the fee is of little or no value unless the land is
underlaid by a quarry or a mine.'" New Mexico v. United States Trust Co., 172 U.S. 171,
183 (1898) (citation omitted).
8

Accordingly, only claims established before December 15, 1870, "overrode the
railroad grant; conflicting claims arising after that time could not be given effect." Leo
Sheep, 440 U.S. at 679 (construing 1862 Congressional grant to Union Pacific). The trial
court granted partial summary judgment for Union Pacific, ruling that Weiser's claim to
the property could not be given effect because it arose after the date of the Act. This
Court should affirm the ruling of the trial court for the following reasons:
First, Weiser failed to preserve the argument that the date of his predecessor-ininterest's first declaratory statement under the Pre-emption Act establishes his priority
date. Accordingly, this Court should decline to address the argument.
Second, the date of Weiser's predecessor-in-interest's first declaratory statement
does not determine Weiser's priority in any event. The 1870 Congressional grant to Utah
Central was of a right-of-way only. It did not include a grant of "checkerboard" sections
of land adjacent to the right-of-way. United States Supreme Court precedent
distinguishes between these two types of railroad land grants and holds, consistent with
the plain language of the acts, that a right-of-way grant is unqualified. Consequently, a
right-of-way grant can be defeated by a pre-emption claimant only if the pre-emption
claimant has paid the full purchase price prior to passage of the right-of-way grant. The
filing of a declaratory statement alone is insufficient.
Third, title to the disputed property passed to Utah Central on the date the Act,
December 15, 1870. The Secretary of the Interior found that Utah Central had complied
with the requirements of the Act. Even if Utah Central had not complied, only the United
9_

States could seek forfeiture. The United States did not do so, and Weiser does not have
standing to contest Utah Central's compliance. Further, the validity and effectiveness of
the right-of-way grant to Utah Central has been affirmed twice by the Utah Supreme
Court and once by the United States Supreme Court.
Fourth, because the right-of-way grant to Utah Central was valid and effective as
of the date of the Act, and because Weiser's predecessor-in-interest had not acquired a
vested interest in the disputed property before the date of the Act, all of Weiser's claims
based on state law were properly dismissed by the trial court. State law cannot operate to
impair a Congressional right-of-way grant.
Finally, the sale of the disputed property to UTA did not effect a reversion to the
United States. Union Pacific sold the property pursuant to a federal statute that permits a
railroad to sell lands within its right-of-way to a state department of transportation or its
nominee. The sale was proper and Weiser does not have standing to challenge it.
For these reasons, the trial court properly granted partial summary judgment in
favor of Union Pacific and its judgment should be affirmed.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF THE FILING OF A
DECLARATORY STATEMENT UNDER THE PRE-EMPTION ACT BECAUSE WEISER
FAILED TO PRESERVE IT

The declaratory statement issue was not preserved below, and this Court should
decline to address it. Weiser proffered evidence in the trial court that his predecessor-ininterest, Tomlinson, filed two declaratory statements, one before the December 15, 1870,
right-of-way grant was passed, and one after.2 R. 2945 at 25, 2468. However, Weiser
never argued to the trial court, either in connection with the proffer or at any other time,
that the date of the first declaratory statement should be used to determine priority. As a
result, Union Pacific did not have an opportunity to address this argument in the trial
court.
In his opening brief, Weiser offers three record citations to demonstrate that the
declaratory statement issue was raised below. However, in each instance, the cited
portion of the record is a court order rather than a document in which Weiser might have
raised the issue or cited relevant case law. Op. Br. at 1 (citing R. 1515-29, Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Summary Judgment (attached as Add. B); R. 2390-91,
Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment Filed by the Parties (attached as Add. C); and

2

For this reason, if this Court rules that the declaratory statement date establishes priority,
the case should be remanded so that the trial court can determine which of Tomlinson's
two declaratory statement dates should be used.

11

R. 2909, Revised Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgment
(attached as Add. D)).
The only mention of the declaratory statement issue in any of the cited orders is the
following quote from the Revised Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and
Judgment: "Weiser contended that Tomlinson's interest in the property was superior to
the Railroad's because Tomlinson presented his Declaratory Statement of Pre-emption on
April 17, 1869 before the Conditional Grant was approved by Congress and therefore the
Property was not part of the 'public lands' at the time Congress approved the Conditional
Grant." R. 2909 (attached as Add. D) (emphasis in original).
However, in the December 8, 2005, bench trial, Weiser proffered evidence
concerning Tomlinson's efforts to comply with pre-emption requirements but did not
inform the court or counsel for Union Pacific that he believed that case law supported the
conclusion that the date of Tomlinson's declaratory statement was the operative date for
purposes of establishing priority. Instead, his comments were more general, and did not
specifically raise the issue. Counsel for Weiser stated: "[W]e'd like an opportunity to file
a motion with the Court setting forth the points and authorities that—and the legal
research that we have gathered with respect to the preemption issue." R. 3025. The trial
court was not receptive to reconsidering its prior ruling on priority but stated, "I have no
objection to your doing that." R. 3026. Nevertheless, Weiser never filed a motion or any
other paper setting forth points and authorities with respect to the declaratory statement
issue, until his filings in this appeal.
12

""'[T]o preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first raise the issue in
the trial court/' giving that court an opportunity to rule on the issue.'" Searle v. Searle,
2001 UT App 367, ^ 179 38 P.3d 307 (citations omitted, alteration in original). "'[T]he
issue must be specifically raised'" and "a party must introduce 'supporting evidence or
relevant legal authority.'" Id. (citations in original). This Court will address only legal
arguments that were raised in the district court. Sweet v. Sweet,, 2006 UT App 216, | 5
n.2, 138 P.3d 63; Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126, 127 (Utah 1987).
Weiser argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it failed to apply
controlling law. Op. Br. at 4, 24-25, 31-32. Yet Weiser neglected to bring that law to the
attention of the trial court. As a result, the trial court did not rule on the issue. The
declaratory statement issue was not preserved for appeal and this Court should decline to
address it.
Even if Weiser had preserved the declaratory statement issue for appeal, however,
the argument fails because it is based on a misunderstanding of case law construing
railroad land grants. In the event that this Court decides to address the issue, an analysis
follows.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT UNION PACIFIC'S
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY IS SUPERIOR TO WEISER'S

A

Lands to which pre-emption claims had attached were not excluded
from Utah Central's right-of-way grant

The 1870 right-of-way grant to Utah Central did not except lands to which preemption or homestead rights had "attached." The grant to Utah Central simply provided:
That the right of way through the public lands be, and the
same is hereby, granted to the Utah Central Railroad
Company . . . and the right, power, and authority is hereby
given to said corporation to take from the public lands
adjacent to the line of said road material of earth, stone,
timber, and so forth, for the construction thereof. Said way is
granted to said railroad to the extent of two hundred feet in
width on each side of said railroad where it may pass through
the public domain, including all necessary ground for stationbuildings, work-shops, depots, machine-shops, switches, sidetracks, turn-tables, and water-stations[.]
16 Stat. 395 (attached as Add. A). Like other right-of-way grants to railroads, the grant to
Utah Central contained no exceptions or exclusions.
However, in addition to a right-of-way grant, such as the grant to Utah Central,
Congress gave some railroads "checkerboard sections" of property adjacent to the railroad
line that could be sold to help finance construction. These land grants often contained
limiting language, excepting from the grant any lands to which pre-emption or homestead
rights had "attached." For example, on July 1, 1862, Congress made the following grant
to the Central Pacific:
"That there be, and is hereby, granted to the said company, for
the purpose of aiding in the construction of said railroad and
telegraph line, and to secure the safe and speedy
14

transportation of the mails, troops, munitions of war, and
public stores thereon, every alternate section of public land,
designated by odd numbers, to the amount of five alternate
sections per mile on each side of said railroad, on the line
thereof, and within the limits often miles on each side of said
road, not sold, reserved, or otherwise disposed of by the
United States, and to which a pre-emption or homestead claim
may not have attached, at the time the line of said road is
definitely fixed."
Tarpey v. Madsen, 53 P. 996, 997 (Utah 1898) (quoting 12 Stat. 492 (emphasis added)).
The character of the grant to Utah Central is determinative of the issue of priority
in this case. The United States Supreme Court long ago held that:
the grant of the right of way differed from the grant of alternate
odd-numbered sections in that, while both were expressed in the
words of a grant inpraesenti, the former was without limitation
or exception, while the latter was expressly made subject to the
limitation or exception that it should not include any lands
which, although public at the date of the grant, were sold,
reserved, or otherwise disposed of by the United States, or to
which a preemption or homestead claim had attached, at the date
of definite location.
Stuart v. Union Pac. R. Co., 227 U.S. 342, 353 (1913); accord Nielsen v. Northern Pac. R.
Co., 184 F. 601, 602 (9th Cir. 1911).
The United States Supreme Court explained the policy served by the limitations
placed on grants of "checkerboard" sections:
The sections granted could be ascertained only when the routes
were definitely located. This might take years, the time
depending somewhat upon the length of the proposed road and
the difficulties of ascertaining the most favorable route. It was
not for the interest of the country that in the mean time any
portions of the public lands should be withheld from settlement
or use because they might, perhaps, when the route was
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surveyed, fall within the limits of a grant. Congress, therefore,
adopted the policy of keeping the public lands open to
occupation and pre-emption, and appropriation to public uses,
notwithstanding any grant it might make, until the lands granted
were ascertained, and providing that if any sections settled upon
or reserved were then found to fall within the limits of the grant,
other land in their place should be selected. Thus, settlements
on the public lands were encouraged without the aid intended for
the construction of the roads being thereby impaired.
Railroad Co. v. Baldwin, 103 U.S. 426, 429 (1880).
However, grants of rights-of-way only needed no qualification because "lands would
not be the less valuable for settlement by a road running through them. On the contrary,
their value would be greatly enhanced thereby." Id. at 430. Further, a "right of way for the
whole distance of the proposed route was a very important part of the aid given" in the rightof-way grants. Id. If a railroad company were
compelled to purchase its way over any section that might be
occupied in advance of its location, very serious obstacles would
be often imposed to the progress of the road. For any loss of
lands by settlement or reservation, other lands are given; but for
the loss of the right of way by these means, no compensation is
provided, nor could any be given by the substitution of another
route.
Id
In his opening brief, Weiser relies on cases construing the language of the
qualified grant of "checkerboard" sections to the Central Pacific Railroad under a July 1,
1862, Act of Congress, 12 Stat. 489. Op. Br. at 28-31 (citing Tarpey v. Madsen, 178 U.S.
215 (1900); Whitney v. Taylor, 158 U.S. 85 (1895)). Those cases interpreted the term
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"attached" as used in the qualified land grant to mean something less than "perfected."3
Specifically, case law held that, where the exception applied, a pre-emption claim
"attached" when a declaratory statement was filed. Contrary to Weiser's argument, Op.
Br. at 4-5, this did not perfect a pre-emption claim. It merely began the process.
Nevertheless, the interests of would-be pre-emptioners who had filed declaratory
statements were preserved by excluding their claims from the "checkerboard" sections
granted to the Central Pacific.
By contrast, right-of-way grants, including the right-of-way grant to Utah Central,
did not contain the term "attached," nor did they provide for any exceptions or exclusions.
The United States Supreme Court held that, "[h]ad a similar qualification upon the
absolute grant of the right of way been intended, it can hardly be doubted that it would
have been expressed. The fact that none is expressed is conclusive that none exists."
Stuart, 227 U.S. at 353; accord Reno v. Southern Pac. Co., 268 F. 751, 756 (9th Cir.
1920).
Weiser relies upon cases that interpret the exclusion of lands to which a preemption claim had "attached." These cases are not relevant to the interpretation of the
unqualified right-of-way grant to the Utah Central at issue in this case. Instead, the
effectiveness of Tomlinson's pre-emption claim as against Utah Central's right-of-way

3

This is consistent with the language of the land grant acts, which distinguished between
lands that had been "sold, reserved, or otherwise disposed of by the United States," on the
one hand, and lands "to which a pre-emption or homestead claim mav not have attached"
on the other. See, e.g., 12 Stat. 492 (emphasis added).
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grant is governed by the many cases specifically construing unqualified right-of-way
grants.

B.

Utah Central had superior title because Weiser had not paid the full
purchase price for his pre-emption claim when the right-of-way Act
was passed

Tomlinson took subject to the railroad's right-of-way because he had not yet paid
the full purchase price for his claim prior to the date of the right-of-way grant. "[U]nder
the general laws of the United States, one who, having made an entry, is in actual
occupation under the preemption or homestead law, cannot be dispossessed of his priority
at the instance of any individual" Union Pac. R. Co. v. Harris, 215 U.S. 386, 389 (1910)
(emphasis added). However, "the power of Congress over lands which an individual is
seeking to acquire under either the pre-emption or the homestead law remains until the
payment of the full purchase price required by the former law or the full occupation
prescribed by the latter[.]" Id; Northern Pac. Co. v. Smith, 111 U.S. 260, 269 (1898)
(only vested rights limit power of Congress over public lands and vested rights are
obtained only when purchase money has been paid and receipt of proper land officer
given to purchaser); Buxton v. Traver, 130 U.S. 232, 236 (1889) (same); see Reno, 268 F.
at 761 ("'public lands' . . . are such lands as remained with the government for ultimate
disposition, lands to which the government had not already parted with the fee").
In Pender v. Board of Education, this Court noted the United States Supreme
Court's characterization of the pre-emption statutes as "an offer by the government
conditioned upon filing a declaratory statement and performing certain other acts.
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Unless these conditions are met, there is no acceptance of the offer and no rights arise in
favor of the settler." 296 P.2d 975, 977 (Utah 1956) (emphasis added). '"When these
prerequisites were complied with, the settler for the first time acquired a vested right in
the premises of which he could not be subsequently deprived.'" Id. (quoting Gonzales v.
French, 164 U.S. 338 (1896)). As the United States Supreme Court held in Emblem v.
Lincoln Land Co., "the rights of a claimant are to be measured by the acts of Congress,
and if they show 'that he acquired no vested interest in the land, then, as his rights are
created by the statutes, they must be governed by their provisions, whether they be hard or
lenient.'" 184 U.S. 660, 664 (1902) (quoting Frisbie v. Whitney, 76 U.S. 187 (1869)).
Because the grant to Utah Central was an unqualified right-of-way grant rather
than a qualified grant of "checkerboard" sections, priority is determined by the date on
which the pre-emption claimant paid the full purchase price of his claim and received a
receipt from the land office.4 Only if these events occurred before the date of the rightof-way grant could Weiser's interest be superior to Union Pacific's. Weiser's proffered
evidence suggests that Tomlinson made cash entry and obtained a purchase receipt on

4

To the extent that this rule of law differs materially from the trial court's reliance on
patent date as the reference date for establishing priority, the trial court's ruling "'is
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such
ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or
action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on
appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed
on by the lower court'" Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61 \ 18, 29 P.3d 1225 (emphasis in
original) (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2
(1969)).

19

February 6, 1872, over one year after Congress passed the right-of-way grant to Utah
Central.5 Accordingly, Tomlinson took subject to the right-of-way conferred by the Act.
See Stuart, 277 U.S. at 354 (emphasis added); Baldwin, 103 U.S. at 430. The trial court
properly so concluded and its judgment should be affirmed.6

5

Weiser argues that the trial court's refusal to admit the proffered evidence is reversible
error. Op. Br. at 2, 4, 28, 31-32. However, "a trial court has broad discretion to
determine whether proffered evidence is relevant, and [this Court] will find error in a
relevancy ruling only if the trial court has abused its discretion. Additionally, an
erroneous evidentiary ruling will lead to reversal only if, absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood that there would have been a more favorable result for the
defendant. A reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome exists when the
appellate court's confidence in the verdict actually reached is undermined." State v.
Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 780-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The Court's confidence in the
trial court's judgment in this case should not be undermined because the proffered
evidence does not change the result.
6

Weiser argues that it was error for the trial court to reverse its prior summary judgment
in favor of Weiser in response to Union Pacific's motion for reconsideration. Op. Br. at
3, 7, 45. To the contrary, Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows "'a
[trial] court to change its position with respect to any order or decision before a final
judgment has been rendered in the case.'" U.P.C., Inc. v R.O.A. General, Inc., 990 P.2d
945, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Trembly v. Mrs. Fields
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)).
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III.

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR DETERMINED THAT UTAH CENTRAL
FULFILLED THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT AND UTAH CENTRAL ACQUIRED
TITLE ON DECEMBER 15,1870

Because the Secretary of the Interior found that Utah Central had complied with
the requirements of the 1870 right-of-way grant, title to the disputed property passed to
Utah Central as of the date of the Act, December 15, 1870. Accordingly, the trial court
correctly entered judgment for Union Pacific, and this Court should affirm.
A

Utah Central complied with the requirements of the right-of-way Act

The right-of-way Act required Utah Central to accept its terms and conditions and
to file a map showing the location of the already-constructed railroad line. The Act
required these steps to be taken within three months of passage of the Act, or by March
15, 1871. To fulfill the requirements, Utah Central accepted the terms and conditions of
the Act by letter to President Ulysses S. Grant, which he received by March 4, 1871. R.
322, 328, 341. Likewise, on March 6, 1871, Utah Central transmitted to the Secretary of
the Interior a profile map showing the line of the already-constructed railroad. R. 322,
325-26.
The right-of-way Act did not instruct Utah Central to file a certified profile map.
It simply stated that "within three months from the passage of this act the said Utah
Central Railroad Company shall file with the Secretary of the Interior a map to be
approved by him, exhibiting the line of the railroad of said company, as the same has been
located and constructed[.]" 16 Stat. 395 (attached as Add. A). Nevertheless, the
Secretary of the Interior rejected the profile map because it was not certified. R. 325.
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Three weeks later, the Secretary received a certified profile map from Utah Central,
which he accepted on March 30, 1871. R. 339.

S.

Rejection of the timely-filed map did not result in a forfeiture

Although Section 4 of the Act carried the penalty of forfeiture if Utah Central
failed to accept its terms and conditions in the manner and by the deadline set, 16 Stat.
395 § 4 ("if such acceptance and service shall not be so made, this grant shall be void"),
the Act included no such penalty for failure timely to file a profile map. Moreover, courts
have consistently rejected claims that noncompliance with the technical requirements of
railroad land and right-of-way grants resulted in automatic forfeiture. For example, in
Bybee v. Oregon & Central Railroad Co., the United States Supreme Court considered
what consequence, if any, accompanied a railroad's failure to complete the road within
the time limit set by the applicable acts of Congress. 139 U.S. 663, 673 (1891). The act
in question stated that, if the railroad failed to complete the line within the time limit
provided, "'this act shall be null and void, and all the lands not conveyed by patent to said
company or companies, as the case may be, at the date of any such failure, shall revert to
the United States

'" Id. at 674 (quoting 14 Stat. 239 § 8).

Even Congress's declaration that the act would be "null and void" was not
interpreted by the Bybee court as requiring an automatic forfeiture, or even as providing
grounds on which an individual could challenge railroad title to the right-of-way. Id. at
676. Instead, the Court held that
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'"no one can take advantage of the non-performance of a
condition subsequent annexed to an estate in fee but the grantor
or his heirs . . . ; and, if they do not see fit to assert their right to
enforce a forfeiture on that ground, the title remains unimpaired
in the grantee
And the same doctrine obtains where the
grant upon condition proceeds from the government; no
individual can assail the title it has conveyed on the ground that
the grantee has failed to perform the conditions annexed.'"
Id. at 675 (citation omitted); accord Northern Pac. R. Co., Ill U.S. at 441 ('"failure to
complete the road within the time limited is treated as a condition subsequent, not
operating ipso facto as a revocation of the grant, but as authorizing the government itself
to take advantage of it, and forfeit the grant by judicial proceedings, or by an act of
Congress, resuming title to the land'" (citation omitted)); Central Pac. R. Co. v. Dyer, 5
F. Cas. 364, 368 (D. Nev. 1871) (requirement to designate general route and file map "in
no respect affected the grant of the right of way; it only furnished the means by which the
secretary could withdraw the lands within a specified distance of such designated route
from pre-emption, private entry and sale")
Accordingly, '"lands granted by Congress to aid in the construction of railroads do
not revert after a condition broken until a forfeiture has been asserted by the United
States, either through judicial proceedings instituted under authority of law for that
purpose, or through some legislative action legally equivalent to judgment of office found
at common law.'" Northern Pac. Ry. Co., Ill U.S. at 441 (quoting St. Louis, I. M. & S.
Ry. Co. v. McGee, 115 U.S. 469, 473 (1885)); Smith, 171 U.S. at 268 ("only the United
States could complain of the act of the [railroad] company in changing the location of its
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tracks from that previously selected"); Bybee, 139 U.S. at 675 (same). Thus, while
Weiser argues otherwise, Op. Br. at 34, the United States Supreme Court has held that
failure of a condition "ought not to be treated as a forfeiture, unless the language of the
act be so clear and unambiguous as to admit of no other reasonable construction." Bybee,
139 U.S. at 677.
These cases are consistent with holdings of the United States Supreme Court that
Congressional grants to railroads stand on a different footing than merely private grants,
and should receive more liberal interpretations in favor of the governmental purposes for
which they were passed. Leo Sheep, 440 U.S. at 683; Missouri, Kans., & Tex., 97 U.S. at
497 ("It is always to be borne in mind in construing a congressional grant, that the act by
which it is made is a law as well as a conveyance, and that such effect must be given to it
as will carry out the intent of Congress."). Those important governmental purposes
require that the quasi-judicial decisions of the Secretary of the Interior in granting railroad
rights-of-way be protected from collateral attack. Van Wyck, 106 U.S. at 368-69 ("A
third party cannot take upon himself to enforce conditions attached to the grant when the
government does not complain of their breach." (citation omitted)); French v. Fyan, 93
U.S. 169, 171 (1876) (holding that "action of the land-office in issuing a patent for any of
the public land, subject to sale by pre-emption or otherwise, is conclusive"); Boise
Cascade Corp. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 630 F.2d 720, 723 (10th Cir. 1980) ("The actions
of the Secretary may not be reviewed in this collateral proceeding."); King v. McAndrews,
111 F. 860, 864 (8th Cir. 1901) (holding that mistake of law or fact on issue department
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had power and duty to decide is impervious to collateral attack); Union Pac. Land
Resources Corp. v. Moench Inv. Co., Ltd., 696 F.2d 88, 91 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that
issuance of patent after administrative determination that lands were not mineral in
character was final administrative decision conclusive against collateral attack); Rio
Grande W. Ry. Co. v. Stringham, 110 P. 868, 871 (Utah 1910) (holding that state court
was not proper forum and proceeding brought by adverse claimant was not proper
proceeding in which to question Secretary of Interior's determination that railroad grant
applied even though railroad built road only half as long as anticipated).
This is true even when it is later alleged that the railroad acquired the benefit of an
act through "fraudulent representations." Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co., 147 U.S.
165, 172 (1893); accord French, 93 U.S. at 171-72. The Supreme Court gave a cogent
rationale for this rule:
[I]t would be a departure from sound principle, and contrary
to well-considered judgments in this court, and in others of
high authority, to permit the validity of [a] patent... to be
subjected to the test of the verdict of a jury on such oral
testimony as might be brought before it. It would be
substituting the jury, or the court sitting as a jury, for the
tribunal which Congress had provided to determine the
question, and would be making a patent of the United States a
cheap and unstable reliance as a title for lands which it
purported to convey.
Fre«cfc,93U.S.atl72.
If the lands over which the right-of-way was granted were public lands, subject to
the operation of the statute, "the question whether the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit
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of the grant was one which it was competent for the secretary of the interior to decide . . .
." Noble, 147 U.S. at 176. Therefore, Weiser's challenge to the 1870 right-of-way grant
to Utah Central is misguided. Even if the certified profile map had been required by the
Act, imposing forfeiture for a three-week delay in certifying a map would have been
inconsistent with the purposes for which Congress passed the 1870 Act. Moreover, it
would have worked a "harsh and unjust" result, as it would have left Utah Central with a
constructed railroad, but no right-of-way. By bee, 139 U.S. at 677.
Utah Central filed the original profile map in conformance with the Act. The
Secretary of the Interior then imposed an additional requirement not found in the Act—
that the profile map be certified. Utah Central complied with this extra-statutory
requirement and the Secretary accepted the second, certified map. Further, the United
States, which was aware that the railroad was already constructed and in operation, never
sought a forfeiture. Accordingly, title passed to Utah Central as of the date of the Act and
Weiser lacks standing to challenge this disposition of public lands made by the United
States almost 140 years ago.

IV.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
HAVE AFFIRMED THE VALIDITY OF THE 1870 RIGHT-OF-WAY GRANT TO
UTAH CENTRAL

The trial court's partial summary judgment to Union Pacific is supported by Utah
Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court cases specifically affirming the validity
of the right-of-way grant to Utah Central. Significantly, the Utah Supreme Court
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determined in 1914 that the Act was properly accepted by Utah Central. In Salt Lake
Investment Co. v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., the plaintiff sought compensation
from the defendant railroad for the taking of private property for public use. 148 P. 439,
440 (Utah 1914). Like Weiser's trace of title to Tomlinson, the plaintiff in Salt Lake
Investment traced its title to an 1877 grant of property within the railroad's right-of-way.
Id. at 442. The railroad counterclaimed, claiming title to the property under the very same
Act at issue in this case. Id. at 440.
The Utah Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs challenge to the railroad's title
and affirmed the validity and effect of the Act. Id. at 444-45. Specifically, the court
ruled that Utah Central had complied with the requirements of the Act:
On December 15, 1870,... Congress granted to the
Utah Central Railroad Company, for railroad purposes, "a
right of way through the public lands * * * 200 feet in width
on each side of said railroad where it may pass through the
public domain," from a point at or near Ogden City to Salt
Lake City, Utah Territory. The grant required acceptance and
was accepted in February, 1871, at which time the Utah
Central Railroad Company filed with the Secretary of the
Interior its articles of incorporation and map showing the
route of its road, etc.
Id. at 443 (second omission in original; emphasis added). Because the disputed property
was located within the federally granted right-of-way, the Utah Supreme Court concluded
that the plaintiff had no claim to the property. Id. at 444-45.
The plaintiff appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Salt Lake Inv. Co. v.
Oregon Short Line R. Co., 246 U.S. 446 (1918). The High Court also confirmed the

27

validity of the right-of-way grant, expressly recognizing that it conveyed the right-of-way
to Utah Central on December 15, 1870, the date the Act was passed. Id. at 447.
Even before the Salt Lake Investment cases, the right-of-way grant to Utah Central
had been judicially affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. In Moon v. Salt Lake County,
the court rejected an argument that the 1870 right-of-way grant ended at the legal
boundary of Salt Lake City, excluding "the terminus of the railroad, which was then and
is now located near the business portion and center of the city . . . . " 76 P. at 224, 224.
The court held that
The language of the act under consideration, the same as in
other congressional acts of similar character and purpose, is in
terms of a grant in presenti, and imports immediate transfer of
interest, and segregation of the land embraced in the grant
from the public domain. The grant itself, to the*extent of the
land included therein, operated as a reservation to any patent,
based upon subsequently acquired rights, issued for any
portion of the public lands across which the right of way
extends, even though no reservation may appear in express
terms in such patent.
Id. at 225.
Thus, the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court both have
ruled that Congress's right-of-way grant to the Utah Central was a present grant that
became effective on the date the Act was passed, December 15,1870. The trial court so
ruled and the judgment should be affirmed.
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V.

STATE LAW CLAIMS ARE IRRELEVANT

State law claims, statutory or common law, may not be employed to diminish a
railroad's title, received by Congressional grant. The United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly held as follows:
"The courts of the United States will construe the grants of
the general government without reference to the rules of
construction adopted by the states for their grants; but
whatever incidents or rights attach to the ownership of
property conveyed by the government will be determined by
the states, subject to the condition that their rules do not
impair the efficacy of the grants or the use and enjoyment of
the property by the grantee."
Townsend, 190 U.S. at 270-71 (quoting Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 669 (1891)). The
intent of Congress in granting lands to railroads "should not be defeated by applying to
the grant the rules of the common law, which are properly applicable only to transfers
between private parties.... But the rules of the common law must yield in this, as in all
other cases, to the legislative will." Missouri, Kans. & Tex,, 97 U.S. at 497; Kindred v.
Union Pac. R. Co., 168 F. 648, 653-54 (8th Cir. 1909) (right-of-way cannot be lost by
laches or acquiescence, and possession by individuals does not ripen into title, regardless
of lapse of time).
In Boise Cascade, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disposed of the plaintiffs
claims of adverse possession, abandonment, estoppel, and boundary by acquiescence by
stating, "[t]hese claims are all irrelevant." 630 F.2d at 724. The court elaborated: "[I]n
granting the right of way Congress conclusively determined the strip covered was
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necessary for an important public work

" Id. "'The whole of the granted right of

way must be presumed to be necessary for the purposes of the railroad, as against a claim
by an individual of an exclusive right of possession for private purposes.'" Id. (quoting
Townsend, 190 U.S. at 272).
The Tenth Circuit also disposed of statutory challenges to railroad land grant title.
In particular, the plaintiff in that case raised claims under Utah's bona fide purchaser
statute, the Occupying Claimants Act, and the Marketable Record Title Act. Id. The
Tenth Circuit ruled that "[i]t is enough to say that state law cannot operate to impair the
efficacy' of a federal grant or vest title in someone other than the federal grantee." Id.;
see also Great N. Ry. Co. v. Steinke, 261 U.S. 119, 132-33 (1923) ("neither laches on the
part of the company nor any local statute of limitations can invest individuate with any
interest in the tract, or with a right to use it for private purposes, without the sanction of
the United States"). For these reasons, the trial court properly dismissed all of Weiser's
state law claims, including his claims related to the 1935 quiet title action, and its ruling
should be affirmed.

VI.

WEISER DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE SALE TO UTA,
WHICH WAS PROPER IN ANY EVENT

Although Utah Central's right-of-way grant was subject to "reverter in the event
that the company ceased to use or retain the land for the purpose for which it was
granted," Townsend, 190 U.S. at 271, reversion to the United States was not triggered by
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Union Pacific's sale of the disputed property to UTA. First, the property was sold to
UTA for the development of a regional commuter rail project. Consequently, the
property will continue to be used "for the purpose for which it was granted"—railroad
operations. Id. For this reason, the reversionary interest was not triggered.
Second, federal law expressly permits the conveyance from Union Pacific to UTA:
For the purposes of this title the consent of the United States
is given to any railroad or canal company to convey to the
State transportation department of any state, or its nominee,
any part of its right-of-way or other property in that State
acquired by grant from the United States.
23 U.S.C. § 316. Union Pacific conveyed its right-of-way, which it acquired by grant
from the United States, to UTA, the nominee of the State of Utah. The conveyance is
expressly permitted by federal statute.
Even if the reversionary interest were triggered by Union Pacific's sale to UTA,
title would not vest in Weiser, but in the United States. As demonstrated above, the
patent to Weiser's predecessor-in-interest, Tomlinson, from the United States in 1873 did
not convey any interest in the disputed property, not even a reversionary interest, because
the United States no longer had any interest to convey. The earlier 1870 right-of-way
grant to Utah Central had removed the granted right-of-way from the inventory of public
lands available for patent. Cf. Elder, 2007 UT 46, f 8, 164 P.3d 1238 (holding that
disputed property was no longer public land on date of right-of-way grant because Nephi
City had received patent to land in question three years earlier).

31

Therefore, Weiser does not hold an interest in the disputed property that would
give him standing to challenge Union Pacific's sale to UTA. The trial court properly
rejected Weiser's arguments on this point, and the judgment should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION

The trial court properly ruled that Weiser's claim to the property could not be
given effect because it arose after the date of the Act. First, Weiser failed to preserve the
declaratory judgment issue for appeal. Second, Weiser's predecessor-in-interest did not
pay the full price for his preemption claim until February 6, 1872, more than one year
after the right-of-way Act was passed.
Third, the trial court properly determined that the Secretary of the Interior
approved Utah Central's certified profile map and that the United States, the only party
with standing, never challenged Utah Central's compliance. Consequently, title to the
disputed property passed to Utah Central on December 15, 1870, the date of the Act.
Fourth, the trial court properly rejected all of Weiser's state law claims because
state law cannot operate to impair a Congressional right-of-way grant. Finally, the trial
court properly concluded that Union Pacific's sale of the disputed property to UTA did
not effect a forfeiture.
For these reasons, Union Pacific urges this Court to affirm the judgment entered
below.
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Union Pacific Railroad Company
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ADDENDUM A

PUBLIC ACTS OF THE FORTY-FIRST CONGRESS
Of TH«

UNITED

STATES,

Passed at ike Third Session, which was begun and held at the City of
Washington, in the District of Columbia, on Monday, the fifth day
of December, A. D. 1870, and was adjourned without day on Saturday
the fourth day of March, A. D. 1871.
S. GRANT, President
and President of the Senate.
House of Representatives.

ULTMKS

SCHUTLER COLFAX, Vice-President
JAMES 6 . BLAINE, Speaker of the

CHAP. I. — An Acttoenlarge ths Jurudidion of the probatt Courts in Idaho Territory. Doe. IS, 1170.

Be it enacted by the Senate and Hoxtse ofRepresentatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That the probate courts of the Probata coarts
Territory of Idaho, in their respective counties, in addition to their pro- ^ w t o k i to1*
bate jurisdiction, be, and they are hereby, authorized to hear and deter- certain cMI and
mine all civil causes wherein the damage or debt claimed does not or- criminal caaea;
ceed the sura of five hundred dollars, exclusive of interest, and such
criminal cases arising under the laws of the Territory as do not require
the intervention of a grand jury: Provided, That they shall not have tatootiakad,
jurisdiction in any matter in controversy, when the title, boundary, or cbanctrjr, or diright to the peaceable possession of land may be in dispute, or in chan- Torct *****'
eery or divorce cases: And providedfurther, That in all cases an appeal Appeals.
may be taken from any order, judgment, or decree of said probate courts
to the district court
SEC. 2. And be it farther enacted, That all acts and parts of acts in- Repealing
consistent with this act are hereby repealed: Provided, That this act &****shall not affect any suit pending in the district courts of said Territory at Pending antta.
the time of its passage.
APPROVED, December 18,1870.
CHAP. IL—4nAct grtaUmg to Cfo Utah Ctairal Bmbroad Companya Right of Waw Daa 16,1870.
AmtgktUjn^LmdsJbrtUOmMtnK^wn

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That the right of way through Right of way
the public lands be, and the same is hereby, granted to the Utah Central {JjX!*11 ?U^AL
Railroad Company, a corporation created under the laws of the legislative Utah GSJtrai
assembly of the Territory of Utah, its successor* and assigns, for the con- Ballroad Oomstruction of a railroad and telegraph from a point at or near Ogden City,
ffiSSSP*
in the Territory of Utah, to Salt Lake CSty, m said Territory; and the
^^^f
rfcht, power, and authority is fare] hereby given to said corporation to
take from the public lands adjacent to the line of said road material of material* for
earth, stone, timber, and so forth, for the construction thereof. Said way •""Jj*11?*
is granted to said railroad to the extent of two hundred feet in width on grant

896

FORTY-FIRST CONGftESS.

SESS. m .

CH. 2, 3. 1870.

each side of said railroad where it may pass through the public domain,
including all necessary ground for station-buildings, work-shops, depot*,
machine-shops, switches, side-tracks, turn-tables, and water-stations: ProCompaayto vided, That within three months from the passage of this act the said
S l ^ l L s l S ^ U t m n Ceit**1 Kai'road Company shall file with the Secretary of the Intarr of tit« In- terior a map to be approved by him, exhibiting the line of the railroad of
ttrior within
g^y company, as the same has been located and constructed: Provided
f
W«?£t£»Bs-/Mrt*ert That said company shall not charge the government higher
poruuoa.
rates than they do individuals for like transportation and telegraphic service. And it shall be the duty of the Utah Central Railroad Company
Running oon- to permit any other railroad, which has been or shall be authorized to be
SS^otb*? built by the United States, or bv the legislature of the Territory of Utah,
to
££u!ft. °
^rm running connections with its road on fair and equitable terms.
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That the United States make
Exprefi con- the grants herein, and that the said Utah Central Railroad Company
f111^0^*^ accepts the same, upon the express condition that the said company
fog grant6iP •ball not exercise the power given by section ten of chapter sixteen of the
laws of the Territory of Utah, approved February nineteenth, eighteen
Congrats ma/ hundred and sixty-nine; and upon the further express condition that
wfort* coadi- |f fa ^ J J company make any breach of the conditions hereof, then in.
°*'
such case, at any time hereafter, the United States, by its Congress, may
do any and all acts and things which may be needful and necessary for
the enforcement of such conditions.
Bailroad tobj SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That said Utah Central Railroad
JXSUTM^.
shall be a post route and a military road, subject to the use of the United
States for postal, military, naval, and all other government service, and
also subject to such regulations as Congress may impose, restricting the
charges for such government transportation.
Aocaptaoet of SEC. 4. And be itfiirther enacted, That the acceptance of the terms,
fri&bem™**1' «onditioo* a n d impoflitiona of this act, by the said Utah Central Railroad
writing and la Company, shall be signified in writing nnder the corporate seal of said
UTM month*, company, duly executed pursuant to the direction of its board of directors
first had and obtained, which acceptance shall be made within three
months alter the passage of (his act, and shall be served on the President
of the United States; and if such acceptance and service shall not be so
made, this grant shall be void.
ActflMjbe
SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That Congress may at any time,
altered, fto. having due regard for the rights of said Utah Central Railroad Company,
add to, alter, amend, or repeal this act.
APPROVED, December 15, 1870.
r

P e c 15,1870.

CHAP. IIL—An

Act donating Ckattakoodm Annul to the State cf Florida
educational Purpomt,

fir

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representative* of the United
Chattaaooebes Statu of America in Congrets assembled, That the public property,
fhe
WSSA^^S *° ^ k
P***0*** buildings, and appurtenances thereto belonging, situated
11
eSowu pnT " ^ Gadsden county, in the State of Florida, and known as the u Chattahoochee Araenal," and at present occupied by said State as a penitentiary, be, and the same are [is] hereby, granted and donated to the State
of Florida for educational purposes.
Sftoratsiy of
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the Secretary of War is
J^tomatstta hereby authorized and directed to transfer said property to the board of
tnmftr, aiutto yJibemoi improvement of the State of Florida, to be held br«them in
trust, for the use, benefit, and execution of the purpose of this grant, or
for such other publie purposes as said board may deem proper.
APPROVED, December u>- I M A .

ADDENDUM B

J. CLARE WILLIAMS, # 3490
JEFFERY J. DEVASHRAYEE, #6209
Attorneys for Defendant
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
280 South 400 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1151
Telephone: (801) 595-3270

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GLENC.WEISER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 910749302

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a corporation,

Honorable Rodney S. Page

Defendant.
The matter of Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration having come before the Honorable
Rodney S. Page on July 31, 2001; Stephen W. Call appearing on behalf of Plaintiff and Jeffery J.
Devashrayee appearing on behalf of Defendant; the Court having reviewed Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration, Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration and Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, and having
heard the arguments and representations of counsel; and being fully advised in the premises, hereby
makes its findings of uncontro verted facts, conclusions of law and order of judgment:

FINDINGS OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS
1.

The Act of Congress of December 15, 1870 (16 Stat. 395) ("1870 Act") provides,

among other things, as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, that the right of
way through the public lands be, and the same is hereby, granted to
the Utah Central Railroad Company, a corporation created under the
laws of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Utah, its
successors and assigns, for the construction of the railroad and
telegraph from a point at or near Ogden City, in the territory of Utah,
to Salt Lake City, in said territory; . . . Said way is granted to said
railroad to the extent of 200 feet in width on each side of said railroad
where it may pass through the public domain . . . Provided, that
within three monthsfromthe passage of this act the said Utah Central
Railroad Company shall file with the Secretary of the Interior a map
approved by him, exhibiting the line of the railroad of said company
as the same has been located and constructed:...
2.

According to the 1870 Act, on December 15,1870, Congress granted to Defendant's

predecessor in interest, Utah Central Railroad, for railways purposes, a right of way through the
public lands to the extent of 200 feet in width on each of the track, from a point at or near Ogden to
Salt Lake City, Utah territory.
3.

Utah Central Railroad began construction of the railroad line at Ogden on May 17,

1869, and completed construction to Salt Lake City on January 10,1870.
4.

Utah Central Railroad's acceptance of the terms of the grant was submitted to the

Secretary of the Interior on March 2, 187L
5.

On March 6, 1871, a profile map was filed with the office of the Secretary of the

Interior by Utah Central Railroad.
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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6.

The map was rejected by the Secretary of the Interior and returned to Utah Central

Railroad on grounds that it was not certified.
7.

On March 30,1871, Utah Central Railroad resubmitted the profile map (presumably

a certified map) which was duly accepted and approved by the Secretary of the Interior on that date.
8.

The Secretary of the Interior transmitted to Utah Central Railroad a "Certificate of

Filing of Acceptance of Map" on June 26,1871.
9.

The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Northern Pac. R. Co.. 177 U.S.

435 (1899), previously held that the alleged lapse of a land grant statue before the filing of a profile
map or the construction of a line of railroad was a "condition subsequent" authorizing only the
federal government to seek forfeiture of the railroad land grant for that purpose.
10.

The federal government has never asserted that the land grant made under the 1870

Act lapsed because Utah Central Railroad did not timely file its profile map.
11.

The property to which Plaintiff claims title and which is the subject of this action (the

"Property") is located in Davis County, near the Salt Lake County-Davis County line. All but an
extremely small portion (approximately .045 acres) of the property lies within the boundary lines
of the 400-foot land grant right of way.
12.

Plaintiff claims title to the Property under a patent that his predecessor in interest

received from the United States Government on September 25,1875.
13.

The government patent specifically limits the property conveyed pursuant to the

patent to those public "lands subject to sale" at the time of the patent.
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14.

As early as 1904, only thirty-four (34) years after the grant of the property to Utah

Central Railroad, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the validity and effect of the land grant made
under the 1870 Act in an action to quiet title to certain property within the Salt lake City limits.
Moon v. Salt Lake County. 76 P. 220 (Utah 1904).
15.

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the validity and affect of the same land grant ten

years later in Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.. 148 P.2d 439 (Utah 1914), holding that
the railroad owned the property in question in accordance with the 1870 Act and that because such
property was included or within the federal land grant right of way, the plaintiff had no claim to the
property.
16.

The plaintiff in Salt Lake Inv. appealed the Utah Supreme Court's decision to the

United States Supreme Court, which affirmed both the Utah Supreme Court's decision and the
validity and effect of the same land grant, holding that the property in question was not subject to
preemption by the plaintiff and that the plaintiff had no right, title or interest in the property. Salt
Lake Inv. Co. v. Oregon Short Line R.R. Co.. 246 U.S. 446 (1918).
17.

Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reads in part:
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and
award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in
bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud,
illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release,
res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any
other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense

18.'

Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part:
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(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief
in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or thirdparty claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one
is required....
* * * *

(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections
not presented either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that
the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the
objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be
made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for
judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits . . . .
18.

Defendant has not plead the defense of statute of limitations as an affirmative defense

pursuant to Rules 8(c) and 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing undisputed uncontroverted facts, the Court makes the following
conclusions of law:
1.

Although Utah Central Railroad failed to file a certified map exhibiting the line of

the railroad and approved by the Secretary of the Interior within three months of the passage of the
1870 Act, the alleged lapse of a land grant under the 1870 Act before the filing of a certified profile
map only authorizes the federal government to seek forfeiture of the railroad land grant.
2.

In holding that only the federal government can seek forfeiture of a railroad land grant

if a land grant statute lapses because of latefilingof a profile map, the United States Supreme Court
in Northern Pac. explained:
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Again, it is contended that when a statutory grant contains on the face
of the law a provision that each and every grant, right and privilege
are upon condition that the road shall be completed within a certain
time, and that time expires without performance of the condition, all
future proceedings of the company, even if acquiesced in and
approved by executive officers of the Government, in disregard of the
forfeiture, are unauthorized, ultra vires and forbidden.
In other words, if we understand the position, it is claimed that under
section 8 of the act of July 2, 1964, non-completion of the railroad
within the time limited of itself operates as a forfeiture; the grant
immediately reverts to the Government; and the courts must so hold
on the simple statement of the fact of non-compliance within the
limit. We do not understand this to be a correct statement of law. In
Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall, 44, this court was called upon to
consider the legal import of such a provision in the act of Congress
of June 3,1856, granting public lands to the State of Wisconsin to aid
in the construction of railroads in said State. After providing that the
lands should be sold, from time to time, as the construction of the
railroad progressed, until the road was completed, it was enacted that
"if said road is not completed within ten years no further sales shall
be made, and the lands unsold shall revert to the United States."
No part of the road having been built at the expiration of the period
limited in the grant, it was claimed that the lands reverted to the
United States. It was held by the Circuit Court of the United States
for the District of Minnesota that such lands did not ipso facto revert
to the United States by mere failure to build the road within the
period prescribed by Congress, and that no effect a forfeiture some
act on the part of the government evincing an intention to take
advantage of such failure was essential; and, on error, that ruling was
affirmed by this court, and the following statement of the law was
made by Mr. Justice Field in giving the opinion of the court:
"In what manner the reserved right of the grantor for breach of the
condition must be asserted so as to restore the estate, depends upon
the character of the grant. If it be a private grant, that right must be
asserted by entry or its equivalent. If the grant be a public one, it
must be asserted by judicial proceedings* authorized by law, the
equivalent of an inquest of office at common law, finding the fact of
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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forfeiture, and adjudging the restoration of the estate on that ground,
or there must be some legislative assertion of ownership of the
property for breach of condition, such as an act directing the
possession and appropriating of the property, or that it be offered for
sale or settlement. At common law the sovereign could not make an
entry in person, and, therefore, an office found was necessary to
determine the estate; but, as said by this court in a late case, {United
States v. Repentigny, 5 Wall. 286), 'the mode of asserting or of
resuming the forfeited grant is subject to the legislative authority of
the Government. It may be after judicial investigation, or by taking
possession directly under the authority of the government without
these preliminary proceedings.'
"In the present case no action has been taken either by legislative or
judicial proceedings to enforce a forfeiture of the estate granted by
the act of Congress. The title remains, therefore, in the State as
completely as it existed on the day when the title by location of the
route of the railroad acquired precision and became attached to the
adjoining alternate sections."
In July, 1866, Congress granted unto the California and Oregon
Railroad Company a right of way over the public lands. In a
subsequent suit between the railroad company and one Bybee, a
holder of a mining claim, it was claimed that the railroad company
had forfeited and lost its right under the grant by its failure to
complete its road within the time limited in the act; that such failure
operated ipso facto as a termination of all right to acquire any further
interest in any lands not then patented. But it was held by this court,
in the words of Mr. Justice Brown: "That in all cases in which the
question has been passed upon by this court, the failure to complete
the road within the time limited is treated as a condition subsequent,
not operating ipso facto as a revocation of the grant, but as
authorizing the government itself to take advantage of it, and forfeit
the grant by judicial proceedings, or by an act of Congress, resuming
title to the land." Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall. 44; Van Wyck
v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, are then cited, and likewise St. Louis, & c.t
Railroad Co. v. McGee, 115 U.S. 743, where it was said by Chief
Justice Waite to have been often decided "that lands granted by
Congress to aid in the' construction of railroads do not revert after
condition broken until a forfeiture has been asserted by the United
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States, either through judicial proceedings instituted under authority
of law for that purpose, or through some legislative action legally
equivalent to judgment of office found at common law." "Legislation
to be sufficient must manifest an intention by Congress to reassert
title and to resume possession. As it is to take the place of a suit by
the United States to enforce a forfeiture, and judgment therein
establishing the right, it should be direct, positive and free from all
doubt or ambiguity."
Northern Pac, 177 U.S. at 439-41.
3.

Because the land grant of 1870 was a public grant by the federal government, the

federal government alone must assert by judicial proceedings authorized by law, the equivalent of
an inquest of office at common law,findingthe fact of forfeiture, and adjudging the restoration of
the estate on that ground, or there must be some legislative assertion of ownership of the property
for breach of condition, such as an act directing the appropriating of the property, or that it be offered
for sale or settlement.
4.

Because the federal government has never asserted that the land grant of 1870 lapsed

because Utah Central Railroad did not timely file its profile map, the federal government, regardless
of Utah Central Railroad's late filing, accepted the profile map and recognized and made effective
the land grant in Utah Central Railroad.
5.

Because the federal government accepted the filing of the profile map, and because

the 1870 land grant of therightof way at issue was an inpraesenti grant to an already existing line
of railroad, the right of way was granted to Utah Central Railroad effective December 15,1870, the
date of the 1870 Act. Therefore, all requirements of the 1870 Act, as conditions subsequent, are
irrelevant except as to challenge by the federal government.
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6.

The land grant of 1870 to Utah Central Railroad remains valid today except as to a

challenge by the federal government.
7.

Because the Property is included within the land grant's right of way, Plaintiff has

no valid claim to the Property.
8.

Title to the disputed Property received by Plaintiffs predecessor, by patent from the

United States Government on September 25, 1875, is of no effect because it is subsequent to the
effective date of the land grant.
9.

Plaintiffs claims to the Property are also barred under the doctrine of stare decisis,

which is that once a point of law has been decided, that ruling should be followed by a court of the
same or lower rank in subsequent cases concerning the same legal issue. Once the court of last resort
makes a legal ruling, decisions on the same issue by courts of a lower rank are superseded. State v.
Shoulderblade. 905 P.2d 289,291-92 (Utah 1995).
10.

The Utah Supreme Court previously recognized the validity of the land grant of 1870.

The circumstances underlying the land grant and the general nature and purpose of the land grant
evidence the validity and effect of the land grant:
We have arightto assume that, at the time of the passage of the act,
Congress was aware that the railroad had been constructed to the
station in the city over public lands within the city limits. This,
indeed, appears from the context, for it is provided that within three
months from the passage of the act the railroad company shall file
with the Secretary of the Interior a map showing the line of railroad,
"as the same has been located and constructed": thus showing that
the lawmakers had in mind the railroad as it was actually located
The grant was not a mere gift to the Utah Central Railway Company,
but was designed to promote the interest of the inhabitants of the two
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cities, of the public at large, and of the general government, as well
as those of the grantee
That all such legislation by Congress was
designed to enhance the interests of the government, as well as to aid
such enterprises, is apparent from the terms of the various grants for
railroad purposes. At the times when several acts in aid of inter
mountain and transcontinental railroads were passed, there were yet
immense tracts of public lands unsettled and uncultivated.
Moon, 7 P. at 224-25.
11.

This Court must liberally construe the 1870 Act to effectuate Congress' intent

regarding the subject land grant:
In constructing acts making grants of such character, offering
inducement to individuals or corporations to engage in such
expensive quasi public enterprises, the courts will, without hesitation,
look in to the condition of the country, the circumstances existing at
the time of their passage, and the purposes to be accomplished, and
will give such a construction as will carry out the designs of the
lawmaking power. The inducements to those engaging in such
enterprises are the right of way and the privileges relating to material
for the construction of the road. In the interpretation of the language
employed in granting such a right of way and such privileges, where
the intention of the lawmaker is to subserve the public interest by
aiding the enterprise, more liberality will be exercised than in case of
a grant of a strictly private character; and this with a view to
effectuate the object of Congress. "The acts making the grants," says
Mr. Justice Field, "are to receive such a construction as will carry out
the intent of Congress, however difficult if might be to give full effect
to the language used if the grants were by instruments of private
conveyance. To ascertain that intent, we must look to the condition
of the country when the acts were passed, as well as to the purpose
declared on their face, and read all parts of them together." Winona
& St Peter R.R. Co. v. Barney, 113 U.S. 618,5 Sup.Ct. 606,28 L.Ed.
1109. In United States v. Denver, etc. Railway, 150 U.S. 1, 14
Sup.Ct. 11,37 L.Ed. 975, Mr. Justice Jackson, delivering the opinion
of the court said: "When an act, operating as a general law, and
manifesting clearly the intention of Congress to secure public
advantages or to subserve the public interest and welfare by means of
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT

-10-

ir**nA

benefits, more or less valuable, offers to individuals or to
corporations an inducement under take and accomplish great and
expensive enterprises or works of a quasi public character in or
through an immense and undeveloped public domain, such legislation
stands upon a somewhat different footingfrommerely a private grant,
and should receive at the hands of the court a more liberal
construction in favor of the purposes for which it was enacted."
United States v. Chaplin, 31 Fed. 890; Railroad v. Baldwin, 103 U.S.
426, 26 L.Ed. 5787.
H. at 225.
12.

This Court recognizes the immediate transfer of interest to the Property to Utah

Central Railroad under the 1870 Act consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's determination in
Moon:
The language of the act under consideration, the same as in other
congressional acts of similar character and purpose, is in terms of a
grant in praesenti, and imports immediate transfer of interest, and
segregation of the land embraced in the grantfromthe public domain.
The grant itself, to the extent of the land included therein, operated as
a reservation to any patent, based upon subsequently acquainted
rights, issued for any portion of the public lands across which the
right of way extends, even through no reservation may appear in
express terms in such patent. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Townsend,
190 U.S. 267, 23 Sup.Ct. 671, 47 L.Ed. 1044; Railroad Co. v.
Baldwin, 103 U.S. 426, 26 L.Ed. 578.
Id.
13.

Consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Oregon

Short Line R. Co., supra, this Court recognizes Defendant's compliance with the 1870 Act's
requirements:
On December 15, 1870, . . . Congress "granted to the Utah Central
Railroad Company, for railroad purposes, "a right of way through the
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public lands *** 200 feet in width on each side of said railroad where
it may pass through the public domain," from a point at or near
Ogden City to Salt Lake City, Utah Territory. The grant required
acceptance and was accepted in February, 1871, at which time the
Utah Central Railroad Company filed with the Secretary of the
Interior its articles of incorporation and map showing the route of its
road, etc.
Salt Lake Inv. Co.. 148 P.2d at 443.
14.

Like the Property in this case, the property in Salt Lake Inv. was included or within

the land grant's right of way. Therefore, this Court, like the Utah Supreme Court in Salt Lake Inv..
recognizes the validity and effect of the Act and concludes that Plaintiff has no claim to the Property.
15.

In the appeal in Salt Lake Inv.. the United States Supreme Court confirmed the

validity of the land grant, explaining that the property was "the subject of conflicting claims - one
under a patent to Malcolm MacDuff issued under the Pre-Emption Act, c. 16 Stat. 453, and the other
under an act, chapter 2, 16 Stat. 395, granting a right of way 'through the public lands' to the Utah
Central Railroad Company." Salt Lake Inv.. 246 U.S. at 446-47. Because the right of way was an
inpraesenti grant to an already existing line of railroad, and because Utah Central Raihoad had, in
fact, made a timely acceptance of the grant, the court explicitly recognized that the right of way had
been granted effective December 15,1870, the date of the Act. Id. at 447; Northern Pac. 177 U.S.
at 439-41.
16.

Like the plaintiff in Salt Lake Inv.. Plaintiffs claim to the Property is an "impossible

one" as if he were making no claim to it at all:
[W]e'think MacDuff settlement and declaratory statement under the
pre-emption act were of no effect. They neither conferred any right
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on him nor took anyfromthe government. His claim was not merely
irregular or imperfect, but was an impossible one under the law, and
so the status of the land was not affected thereby. The land continued
to be subject to the disposal of congress and came within the terms of
the right of way as much as if he were making no claim to it Of
course, the presence on public land of a mere squatter does not
exempt it from the operation of such an act containing, as here, no
excepting clause.
Id. at 449.
17.

The cases cited and relied on by Plaintiff, to wit: Gately v. Massachusetts. 2 F.3d

1221 (5th Or. 1993); Lee v. Insurance Co. of North America. 763 P.2d 567 (Haw. 1988); Young v.
Northern Terminals. Inc.. 290 A.2d 186 (Vt. 1972); and In Re Kina's Estate. 268 N.Y.2d 131 (N.Y.
1966), are not applicable because none of these cases are United States Supreme Court or Utah
Supreme Court cases or involves the application or interpretation of an Act of Congress. Further,
the legal issues in the instant case are subject to the legal determinations of both the United States
Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court affirming the validity and effect of the land grant, which
determinations are no less authoritative now than they were in the 1900rs when they were made and
are not subject to interpretation or change by another court regardless of the facts that Plaintiff relies
on in support of his claim to the Property.
18.

Defendant has waived any statute of limitations defense by failing to assert such an

affirmative defense in its Answer.
ORDER OF JUDGMENT
Based on the foregoing uncontroverted facts and conclusions of law, it is hereby
ORDERED, that Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby granted; and it is further
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ORDERED, that the Court's Ruling on Plaintiffs and Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment filed February 24,1995, is hereby reversed; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Court's Third Amended Partial Summary Judgment ("Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law") filed September 6, 1995, is hereby reversed; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.
DATED this

day of October, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Rodney S. Page
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

of October, 2001, a copy of the foregoing was served

in the manner indicated below upon the following:
Steven W. Call, Esq.
Cheri K. Gochberg, Esq.
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker
79 South Main Street
500 Desert Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight
Facsimile
No Service
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JUL 0 8 2005
.
.SECOND .
ILJTAWSTRICT
COURT
SECOND DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF

COUNTY OF DAVIS, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT

GLEN C WEISER, an individual
Plaintiff,

RULING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT FILED BY THE PARTIES
Case No. 910749302 PR

v.

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
Judge: Rodney S. Page
a Utah corporation
Defendant

This case has been before the Court for a number of years and has been the
subject of numerous motions and hearings between the parties, including two
interlocutory appeals to the Utah Supreme Court, which were rejected.
Most recently, the matter was before the Court on February 22, 2005 on motions
and cross-motions for summary judgment on the various remaining issues. Following
the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement based upon the stipulation of
counsel that they would submit to the Court a set of stipulated facts from which the
Court could decide the issue of the location of the center line of the right-of-way, a
central issue in the case.
At this time, no stipulated facts have been presented to the Court, and therefore
the Court will proceed to rule upon those issues before it based upon the
memorandums and arguments previously submitted.
On October 1, 2001, this Court entered its findings and judgment on defendant's
reconsidered motion for summary judgment. In that ruling the Court found that, by act
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of congress of December 15, 1870, the Utah Central Railroad, defendants predecessor
in Interest, was granted a right-of-way through the public lands to the extent of 200 feet
wide on each side of the road from a point near Ogden City to Salt Lake City.
Further, the Court determined that the patent of land in question to George
Tomlinson in 1873, plaintiffs predecessor in interest, to the extent that it was included
in the right-of-way, granted to the Railroad in 1870, was a nullity. The reason being that
the land which was part of the 1870 grant to the Railroad was taken out of the public
land subject to preemption and sale, and therefore the Land Department was without
authority to convey any rights therein. Northern Pacific vs Townsend 190 U.S. 267; 23
S. CT. 671 (1903).
As a result of this Court's prior ruling, the only issues left for determination are: 1)
the location of the right-of-way; 2) the nature of the legal rights conveyed to defendant
in the grant; 3) the effect of the District Court's decree quieting title in the land, plaintiffs
predecessor in interest in 1935; 4) plaintiffs challenge to the conveyance of the right-ofway to the UTA by the defendant; 5) the question of trespass and damages related
thereto in the event defendant is occupying land of the plaintiff not covered by the rightof-way; and 6) the question of sanctions.
As to the question of the exact location of the right-of-way grant, absent the
stipulation of facts by the parties, the Court concludes that there are factual disputes
which preclude the Court from deciding that issue at this time.
Concerning the nature of the legal rights conveyed to the defendant in the grant,
this Court has already determined that the patent issued to plaintiffs predecessor in
1873 was a nullity; however, to clarify the Court's ruling in that regard, this Court would
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conclude that the Railroad was granted a limited fee interest subject only to reverter to
the Federal government should the Railroad fail to use the land for the purpose
specified in the grant. Northern Pacific vs Townsend, supra; Great Northern Railway
Co. vs United States 315 U.S. 262, 62 S. CT 529 (1942).
It is important to note, as stated in the Townsend Case, the nature of the
property interest in land conveyed by grant from congress changed after 1871, and
from then on was only considered to be an easement and not a fee interest.
Given the nature of the title held by the Railroad in the right-of-way, the question
remains as to what, if any, the effect the State District Court decree quieting title in
plaintiff's predecessor in interest has on the right-of-way grant.
This Court would conclude that no action under State law has the ability to limit
or circumscribe the rights granted under the 1870 act, with the exception of the exercise
of limited state police power.
That would include State court decrees quieting title and various other State
legal theories such as adverse possession or The Marketable Record Title Act.
Townsend supra: Boise Cascade Corp. vs Union Pacific Railroad Co., 650 F.2d 720,
(10th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 995 (1981). Even assuming that defendant had
been made a party to the quiet title action, a fact that is in dispute, the decree could not
have altered or taken away from the nature of the grant to the Railroad in this case.
Given the Court's ruling as to the nature of the legal titled conveyed by the grant,
it is clear that any legal rights which may remain in the right-of-way over and above
those belonging to the Railroad, belong to the Federal government exclusively.
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Given the fact that plaintiff has no legal interest in the right-of-way, he has no
legal standing to challenge the transfer of the right-of-way to the Utah Transit Authority.
However, even assuming that plaintiff had standing, he has no basis to challenge the
transfer here.
Federal law specifically grants to the Railroad the right to transfer to the
Department of Transportation of any state, or its nominee, any part of the right-of-way
or its property to be used for a similar purpose. 23 United States Code, Section 316.
Emphasis added.
Here the Utah Transit Authority is a nominee of the Utah State Department of
Transportation and received title to the right-of-way under agreement with the
defendant, dated January 16, 2002 to be used for commuter rail.
Even assuming however, that the transfer was not in keeping with Federal law,
given the Court's above ruling, only the Federal government, as owner of the
reversionary interest, would have standing to challenge it.
For the purpose of the record it should be noted that the Utah Transit Authority
has agreed the defendant should continue to pursue this matter on their behalf and that
UTA would be bound by any decision rendered herein.
The Court next turns to the question of sanctions, if any, that should be
considered by the Court. Each of the parties herein have filed motions for sanctions
against the other. The Court has considered these motions and the memorandums
and arguments submitted in support thereof and in opposition thereto, and being fully
advised in the premises, rules as follows:
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This Court initially granted plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue
of the validity of the 1870 grant on the rationale that defendant's predecessors in
interest failed to comply with the map filing requirements of the 1870 grant.
Subsequent thereto, defendant filed a motion requesting the Court reconsider its
ruling based on decisions of the Utah Supreme Court in the Moon Case and the Salt
,ake Investments Case, decided in 1904 and 1914 respectively. Each of these cases
vas directly in point and were cases in which our Supreme Court specifically upheld the
alidity of the 1870 grant to Utah Central Railroad. Moon vs Salt Lake City, 76 P. 222
JT 1904); Salt Lake Investment vs Oregon Shortline Railroad Company. 148 P. 439
JT 1914), affd., 246 U.S. 446 (1918).
Neither defendant, to whose arguments these cases were directly in point, nor
aintiff cited either of these cases in their memorandums or argument to the Court on
> question of the validity of the 1870 grant. Obviously both of these cases had been
:ided long before this issue came before the Court.
Given the relevance of the cases to the issue before the Court, the Court granted
sndant's Motion for Reconsideration on condition that defendant pay to the plaintiff
sum of $2,000 to cover reasonable expenses incurred to research, resubmit and
gue the Motion for Summary Judgment.
The matter was resubmitted and reargued and the Court modified its prior ruling
i

d upon these cases, and upheld the validity of the 1870 grant.
Subsequent to that time, both parties had submitted motions for sanctions
ist the other. Plaintiff claiming that defendant violated Rule 11 by failing to
jately research and argue the case before the Court; and defendant against the
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plaintiff for failing to find these cases before their action was filed, and filling their action
without proper investigation.
After reviewing the circumstances and the memorandum submitted by counsel,
the Court concludes that the two cases which were not cited by the defendant in its
memorandum or arguments on the original motion were relatively old cases, and as
such, were not readily discoverable through the ordinary means of legal research. The
Court concludes that defendant's failure to cite or argue these cases originally was not
the result of its failure to engage in reasonable inquiry or for the purposes of delaying or
hindering the plaintiff, therefore the defendant's actions in that regard do not rise to the
level that would justify sanctions under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court does find however, that there was good cause to require defendant to pay
the $2,000 to the plaintiff to cover costs incurred by plaintiff to research and resubmit its
memorandum on the reconsidered motion.
As to the defendant's motion for sanctions against plaintiff for pursuing the
various causes of action against defendant without reasonable inquiry, the Court
concludes that the causes of action alleged by plaintiff are reasonable under the
present status of the law or under nonfrivolous arguments for extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law, or the establishment of new law, and therefore defendant's
request for sanctions is hereby denied.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court reserves the question of the location of the
right-of-way and any questions as to trespass or damages in the event the right-of-way
does not cover all of the property claimed by the plaintiff.
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Counsel are instructed to contact the Court's clerk to set a scheduling
conference in order to resolve the remaining issues before the Court within fifteen days
of the date of this ruling.
Dated this

&**• day of July, AD 2005
BY THE COURT:

Rodney S.^age
S.^age
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ruling to:
Steve W. Call
36 South Main Street, #1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jeffery J. Devashrayee
280 South 400 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
postage prepaid this
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day of July, AD 2005.

Alyson Brown
Clerk of Court
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STEVEN W. CALL (A5260)
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 350-1500
Facsimile: (801) 532-7543
Elizabeth M. Peck (6304)
136 South Main Street, Suite 404
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-6088
Facsimile: (801)531-6093
Attorneys for Plaintiff Glen'C. Weiser

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GLEN C. WEISER, an individual,
Plaintiff,
v.

[revised]
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER AND JUDGMENT

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

Civil No. 910749302PR
Hon. Rodney S. Page

The Court having considered the various proceedings previously conducted by the Court
and the Court's-prior rulings in the case and having further considered that all issues'before the
I Or
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pages:
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Court have been heretofore resolved or adjudicated, the Court hereby makes its findings of fact,
conclusions of law and order and judgment as follows:
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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. This long enduring case arises from an action that was filed by Glen C. Weiser
(hereinafter the "Plaintiff or "Weiser") against defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company
(hereinafter "Union Pacific" or "Railroad") regarding a parcel of land located in Davis County,
Utah near the Salt Lake County line (hereinafter the "Property").
2.

A brief history of the case is given by the Supreme Court in Weiser v. Union

Pacific R. Co., 932 P.2d 596 (Utah 1997), which provides, in part, as follows. "In 1873,
Weiser's most remote predecessor in interest purportedly received title to the disputed land
through a federal land grant patent issued by President Ulysses S. Grant. In 1935, the district
court for Davis County quieted title to the disputed property in Roelof Steenblik, one of Weiser's
predecessors in interest. All known entities with a possible claim to the property were made
parties to that action. The Raihoad was not made a party because there was no public record of
its interest. The Railroad did receive constructive notice by publication, however." Id. at 597.
3.

" In 1982, Union Pacific began construction of a semi-truck loading facility on the

disputed property. In 1987, Weiser discovered the Railroad's use of the property and through
counsel requested the Railroad to surrender and vacate the property. The Raihoad refused, and
Weiser had Associated Title Company prepare a title report, which showed that Weiser owned
the property in fee simple. He again made a formal demand that the Raihoad surrender and
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vacate the property. Union Pacific again refused. Plaintiff brought this action to gain possession
V>
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of and to quiet title to the property." Id. at 597.
4.

Union Pacific defended the action "contending that the United States had granted

its predecessor in interest, Utah Central Railroad, a 400-foot-wide "right-of-way through public
lands for the construction of a railroad and telegraph" in March of 1870. One of the conditions
of the grant was that within three months after the passage of the 1870 Act, the Railroad file with
the Secretary of Interior a map approved by him "exhibiting the line of said company, as the
same has been located and constructed." The parties dispute whether this condition was fulfilled.
Weiser contends that because the Railroad did not timely file a certified map that was accepted
by the Secretary of Interior, the Railroads grant of right-of-way fails, [footnote omitted]. After
extensive research and historical analysis, the trial court granted a partial summary judgment that
the grant to the Railroad failed for lack of condition." Id. at 597.
5. Through extensive summary judgment proceedings, the Court determined that the
following facts relating to the parties' controversy were undisputed.
(a) The Act of Congress of December 15,1870 (16 Stat. 395) (hereinafter "1870 Act"),
which is relevant in this matter, provides among other things as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, that the right of way through the public lands be, and
the same is hereby, granted to the Utah Central Railroad Company, a corporation created
under the laws of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Utah, its successors and
assigns, for the construction of a railroad and telegraph from a point at or near Ogden
City, in the territory of Utah, to Salt Lake City, in said territory; ... Said way is granted to
said railroad to the extent of 200 feet in width on each side of said railroad where it may
pass through the public domain ... Provided, that within three months from the passage
of this act the said'Utah Central Railroad 'Company shail file with the Secretary of the
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Interior a map approved by him, exhibiting the line of the railroad of such company as
the same has been located and constructed: ...
16 Stat. 395 (December 15, 1870).
(b) The conditional 200 foot right of way grant pursuant to the 1870 Act would overlap
substantially all of plaintiff s property (hereinafter "Property") which is the subject of this action.
(c)

On March 7, 1871, a profile map was filed with the office of the Secretary of the

Interior by the Utah Central Railroad. Defendant Union Pacific Railroad is a successor in
interest to the Utah Central Railroad.
(d)

On the following day, the map was rejected by the Secretary of the Interior and

returned to the Utah Central Railroad on grounds that it was not certified.
(e)

On March 30, 1871, the Utah Central Railroad resubmitted the profile map

(presumably a certified map) which was duly accepted by the Secretary of the Interior on that
date.
(f)

The Utah Central Railroad failed to file a certified map with the Secretary of the

Interior within the time limitation set by Congress in the 1870 Act.
(g)

In exchange for consideration, plaintiffs predecessors in interest received title to

the Property by patent from the United States Government on September 25, 187[3] [sic].
(j)

Plaintiffs chain of title in the Property appears on the record of the Davis County

Recorder in which county the Property is situated.
(k)

A right-of-way grant to the Utah Central Railroad, which is at issue in this case,

does not appear on any of the plat maps recorded in the Davis County Recorder's Office.
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(1)
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Plaintiff and his predecessors in interest have paid the property taxes on the

Property for at least the past 25 years.
(m)

Defendant made its first improvements and enclosures on the Property when it

commenced the construction of the TOFC facility in 1982.
(n)

There is a disputed question of fact whether defendant Union Pacific Railroad

and/or its predecessor's have paid property taxes on the property.
6. The Court granted Weiser's motion for partial summary judgment pertaining to
the land grant issue in 1995. The Railroad filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was
denied. Thereafter, an appeal was pursued by the Railroad which was later dismissed by the
Supreme Court. On October 19, 2000, the Railroad filed a motion for reconsideration. Weiser
objected to the motion as untimely and improper. The Court determined that it would consider
the motion.
7. Upon considering the Railroad's motion, the Court determined that despite its
prior granting of partial summary judgment in favor of Weiser, the doctrine of stare decisis
required the Court to alter its prior ruling in the case.1 The Court concluded that it was
compelled under the doctrine of stare decisis to change its decision despite the fact that the
undisputed facts reflected that the Utah Central Railroad had failed to comply with the
Conditional Grant. In making its decision the Court acknowledged that Weiser was not a party
to any of the decisions cited by the Court and was not afforded an opportunity to present
evidence or raise issues in those cases.
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8. The Court rejected Weiser's arguments that the Court should have analyzed the
issues in the case under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel and that neither
doctrine was binding upon Weiser in this case. Based upon the Court's legal reasoning, the
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Court reversed its prior summary judgment made in favor of Weiser and granted the Railroad's
motion for partial summary judgment in its October 1, 2001 ruling.
9. Based upon the Courts' amended ruling that the Conditional Grant was valid, the
Court addressed the character of the Grant. The Grant provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, That the right of way through the public lands be, and the same is
hereby, granted to the Utah Central Railroad Company, a corporation created under the
laws of the legislative assembly of the Territory of Utah, its successors and assigns, for
the construction of a railroad and telegraph from a point at or near Ogden City, in the
Territory of Utah, to Salt Lake City, in said Territory; and the right, power, and authority
is hereby given to said corporation to take from the public lands adjacent to the line of
said road material of earth, stone, timber, and so forth, for the construction thereof. Said
way is granted to said railroad to the extent of two hundred feet in width on each side of
said railroad where it may pass through the public domain,...
10. The Court then concluded that the foregoing conveyance conveyed a fee or
limited fee interest in the Property to the Railroad and Weiser has no remaining interest in the
Property. The Court rejected Weiser's argument that the Conditional Grant conveyed only a
right-of-way to the Utah Central Railroad. Consequently, the Court concluded that the subject
Property was owned by the Railroad.

The Court also concluded that Weiser lacked standing to challenge the Grant.
' There was only a small part of the Property that was outside of the 400 foot right-of-way and the parties have
settled any claim thereto.
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11. However, the Court concluded that the Property was in fact part of the "public
%

%

lands" at the time of the Conditional Grant was approved by Congress. In making the foregoing
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determination the Court rejected Weiser's argument that the Property was not taken out of the

®

public lands because Weiser's original predecessor (Tomlinson) had acquired a homestead or
pre-emption interest in the property. Weiser contended that Tomlinson's interest in the property
was superior to the Railroad's because Tomlinson presented his Declaratory Statement of Preemption on April 17,1869 before the Conditional Grant was approved by Congress and therefore
the Property was not part of the "public lands" at the time Congress approved the Conditional
Grant. Weiser contended that his position was supported by case authority. The Court rejected
Weiser's arguments and concluded that the period of time for perfecting an interest in Property
through the doctrine of pre-emption is determined by the date that the final proof of pre-emption
was completed on July 6,1872 and not on April 17, 1869 when Tomlinson's Declaratory
Statement of Pre-emption was made. Because the Court concluded that the date of proof is the
controlling date for the purpose of determining when whether the Property was part of the public
lands, the Court determined that the evidence proffered by Weiser at an evidentiary hearing that
Tomlinson Declaration Statement was made on the public record on April 17, 1869 (before the
Conditional Grant was approved by Congress) was irrelevant.
12. The Court also concluded that the Decree Quieting Title made in favor of
Weiser's predecessor by the Fourth District Court is not dispositive or binding upon this Court's
determination that the Property belongs to the Railroad because no action under state law has the
ability to limit or circumscribe land rights granted to the Railroad. In making this determination
7

the Court rejected Weiser's argument that the Decree Quieting Title to the Property made by the
honorable Judge Pratt in 1935 is binding and enforceable under the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel because the Railroad had no interest of record in the County Recorder and
because the Railroad received constructive notice of the quiet title action by means of publication.
13. The Court has also concluded that the conveyance of its interest in the Property to
another did not cause the Property to revert to Weiser. The Court also rejected the argument
raised by Weiser that defendant Union Pacific intended to remise or release its interest in the
Property when it quitclaimed its interest in the Property to another and rejects the assertion that
the conveyance of its interest by quitclaim deed was conclusive evidence. Weiser contended that
if the conveyance of the Property was a limited fee conveyance, the limited fee was made subject
to reverter to the United States and thereafter passed to Weiser through his chain of title
stemming back to the original land patent given to Tomlinson.
14. The Court has determined that the Railroad did not obtain any interest in the
Property by way of adverse possession because it did not satisfy the requirements needed to
establish a claim of adverse possession and that its ownership interest in the Property is based
solely upon the Conditional Grant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions made by the Court and the prior
proceedings in the case, the Court makes and enters its order and judgment as follows:
ORDERED that defendant Union Pacific Railroad received a limited fee interest in the
Property pursuant to the Conditional Grant;
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ORDERED that defendant Union Pacific Railroad's limited fee did not revert back to the
United States and then transfer forward to Weiser when Union Pacific Railroad purported to
convey its purported interest to another;
ORDERED that Weiser's claims for relief as alleged in his complaint including his
claims to quiet title, restitution, forcible detainer, treble damages, trespass and unjust enrichment
are hereby dismissed with prejudice;
ORDERED that defendant Union Pacific Railroad's alleged defense of adverse
possession is also dismissed for cause; and
ORDERED that this Judgment is final as to the matters ruled upon and shall be entered
by the Clerk of the Court without further delay, the Court having determined that all claims
between the parties in this case have now been adjudicated.
DATED this 3) s Y ~day o f l ^ ^ W

2007.

BY THE COURT:

District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent via first class mail
by depositing the same with the United States Postal Service, postage prepaid to:
JeffDevashrayee
280 South 400 West, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Facsimile No. 212-3978
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing [revised] proposed findings
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of fact, conclusions of law and judgment and order was mailed via first class mail on October 9,
2007 by depositing the same with the United States Postal Service, postage prepaid to:
JeffDevashrayee
280 South 400 West, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Facsimile No. 212-3978
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